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CRIMINAL LAW—MIRRORING THE TRIAL: MAKING
SENSE OF THE LAW OF CLOSING ARGUMENT IN CRIMINAL
CASES
Alex J. Grant*
The law of closing arguments in criminal cases has proven to be a
minefield for prosecutors and judges. Whereas criminal convictions
can be overturned because of improper argument by the government,
acquittals obtained through improper argument by defense counsel
cannot be reviewed because of the Double Jeopardy clause. Two
rules, the prohibition against vouching and the proscription against
the expression of personal opinions, have proven to be very difficult
to apply in a coherent manner, to the point that argument about the
credibility of witnesses has been prohibited in some jurisdictions.
Jury nullification arguments by the defense tend to creep into a
criminal trial during summation, and they present a difficult dilemma
for the ethical prosecutor. Sometimes error in closing argument
occurs when the prosecutor attempts to respond to appeals for jury
nullification, that is, for a verdict outside the law and the evidence
presented in the courtroom. An effective means of policing closing
arguments and of preventing jury nullification would be a rule that
requires closing arguments to mirror the trial. This “mirroring”
principle means that the scope of closing argument should be the same
as the scope of the facts and law presented during the trial. This
principle would set out logical boundaries of proper and improper
argument, and it would help trial judges identify and thwart pleas for
jury nullification.

* Assistant United States Attorney, District of Massachusetts; Senior Adjunct Professor
of Law, Western New England University School of Law. The views expressed in this Article
are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Attorney’s
Office or the United States Department of Justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of closing arguments in criminal trials is, in many respects,
a series of hazy lines,1 which courts have labored to apply in a consistent
or coherent fashion. For the practitioner, that is to say, the prosecutor,2 it
represents a minefield of maxims, or as the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has said, “fundamental verities.”3 In the most famous
formulation, a prosecutor may strike “hard blows” but not “foul ones.”4
The prosecutor may be a vigorous advocate, “so long as he does not stray
into forbidden terrain.”5 Verbal formulations such as these have not done
much, and reported decisions have done precious little, to stake out the
boundaries of this “forbidden terrain.” As a result, the federal and state
case reports in every jurisdiction continue to collect criminal cases in
which convictions are overturned, or nearly overturned, by what is said
during closing argument.6
This Article is directed toward a couple of species of improper
argument, the prohibitions against vouching, and the expressions of
personal opinion. Left to the side are more obvious sins, such as
commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify during a trial,7 referencing
the defendant’s post-arrest silence,8 or injecting racial or similar prejudice

1. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The line between
the legitimate argument that a witness’s testimony is credible and improper ‘vouching’ is often
a hazy one . . . .”).
2. This law is directed at prosecutors because improper argument by defense counsel
which results in an acquittal can never be reviewed on appeal because the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution of the United States of America would bar a retrial. United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
3. United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 976–77 (1st Cir. 1995).
4. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
5. Taylor, 54 F.3d at 976 (quoting Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873
F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir. 1989)).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1991) (“This [c]ourt
has previously commented on the frequency with which it has had to address the ‘acceptable
limits of closing argument.’” (quoting United States v. Pierce, 792 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir.
1986))); Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards
That Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 920 (2011)
(“Prosecutorial over-reaching during closing argument is among the most common forms of
error in criminal cases . . . .”); Rosemary Nidiry, Note, Restraining Adversarial Excess in
Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1996) (“Prosecutorial misconduct in closing
argument has been relatively well documented and extensively litigated.”).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1186 (1st Cir. 1993) (calling it
“bedrock” that the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent).
8. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (holding that prosecutor’s
comment on the defendant’s post-arrest silence improper in cross-examination and closing
argument); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 615–19 (1976) (“[U]se for impeachment purposes of
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into the proceedings.9 These latter categories of forbidden summation are
fundamentally sound prohibitions tied to the law, such as the defendant’s
right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.10 The former categories
(vouching and personal opinions), as they are defined by many courts, can
be untethered from the law and essentially constitute a code of politeness
with fine distinctions which can often be discerned only after the fact.11
The more damning critique made in this Article is that this code of
politeness or good manners can be, in the extreme form adopted by some
jurisdictions, essentially at war with the notion of argument itself.12 This
extreme form, found in the rule that a lawyer may not comment on the
credibility of the defendant or witnesses, forces the sides to avoid the
central issues of the trial. These issues often are the credibility of
witnesses and the dueling narratives of truth presented by the parties
which the jury must choose from.13
This Article identifies another source of uncertainty in the law of
closing arguments: appeals, subtle or otherwise, by the defense for jury
nullification. Jury nullification has a long history in the American legal
system; a robust debate among scholars, practitioners, and even judges
continues about whether jury nullification is ever proper, and if so, under
what circumstances. What cannot be denied is that jury nullification, or
at least the potential for it, exists.14 Jury nullification exists in the
shadows, generally unaddressed by the court during a trial, and it can rear
its head in closing argument, where the defense has more latitude than in
other parts of the trial. The prosecutor is then left with a conundrum in
how to respond. The perceived injustice of the charging decision, of the
petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Federal courts
have long condemned racially inflammatory remarks during governmental summation.”).
Although never reviewed and condemned by an appellate court, the defense argument in the
civil rights-era Emmett Till murder trial was an extreme example of injecting racial prejudice
into a closing argument. Defense counsel said to the all-white jury, “every last Anglo-Saxon
one of you has the courage to free these men,” and warned that their “forefathers would turn
over in their graves if these boys were convicted on such evidence as this.” Shaila Dewan &
Ariel Hart, F.B.I. Discovers Trial Transcript in Emmett Till Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/us/fbi-discovers-trial-transcript-in-emmett-tillcase.html.
10. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617–18.
11. See infra Sections I.C.3–5.
12. See infra Section I.C.5.
13. See id.
14. See Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern
Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 960 (2006) (noting that the phenomenon of jury
nullification occurs when “some juries still acquit even when the evidence indicates that the
defendant has violated the law”).
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potential punishment to the defendant, or of the law itself may be the
elephant in the room, but the prosecutor has limited means to address what
may be on the minds of everyone in the courtroom.
As a practicing prosecutor, I find all of this to be a problem that needs
fixing. Closing arguments are often the culmination of a long process that
includes a police investigation, a grand jury investigation, a careful review
of the charging decision by the prosecutor’s office, painstaking efforts to
provide discovery to the defense, pretrial litigation in the form of motions
to suppress evidence, the parties’ intensive preparation for trial, and the
admission, at trial, of the government’s evidence that may support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The reversal of a conviction
because of a misstep during summation, which may consist of a few words
or phrases delivered inartfully and/or extemporaneously, is an outcome
that should be avoided at all costs. Of course, the prosecutor must be
faithful to both the law and the ethics rules, but the solution does not lie
in emphasizing the general maxims which tend to be exercises in circular
reasoning. Nor is it to be found, as some observers have suggested, in
formulating slightly more specific “guidelines” for counsel to follow.15
Instead, this Article argues that a firmer foundation is needed for the
law of closing arguments, at least with respect to the admonitions against
the expressions of personal opinion and vouching. At present, many
decisions about improper argument have a Justice Potter Stewart “I know
it when I see it” quality,16 an approach that will continue to generate the
uncertainty that produces frequent appellate litigation on the subject. This
Article proposes that the scope of closing argument should be governed
by the scope of the earlier stages of the trial. This would be a workable
principle that would be fair to the parties and help guide the advocate
trying her level best to seek justice. Thus, if the trial has been a “he said,
she said” controversy, it would be proper to address the credibility of
witnesses head-on. Likewise, if the defendant is charged with deliberately
speaking untruths (i.e., lying), the prosecutor should be allowed to argue
that the defendant was dishonest and untruthful without stepping through
a minefield of forbidden and allowed verbal formulations.
This principle would also help to prune the rule against expressions
of personal opinion down to its essential core without ensnaring
statements which articulate what is obvious—that is, the prosecutor trying
the case believes the defendant to be guilty. If the prosecutor seeks to
15. See Michael J. Ahlen, The Need for Closing Argument Guidelines in Jury Trials, 70
N.D. L. REV. 95, 105–07 (1994); Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1327–34.
16. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (indicating he
could not define hard-core pornography, but he knew it when he saw it).
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assure the jury that there are facts known to him but not introduced during
the trial which cinch the defendant’s guilt, that is clearly improper. On
the other hand, it should not matter that a prosecutor who sticks to arguing
the case presented at trial has ventured into “I believe” or “I submit”
statements.
Finally, requiring the closing argument to mirror the scope of the trial
would help address the issue of jury nullification in a constructive way.
Many facts that go into the charging decision of the prosecutor’s office,
or as the Supreme Court has termed it, the “moral[] reasonable[ness]” of
a conviction,17 are not known to the jury. If the moral righteousness of
the case is to be contested during the trial, the prosecutor would have many
things to say that would not be admitted into evidence under traditional
notions of relevance. When the defense suggests that a conviction is not
just—as opposed to attacking the government’s evidence or its application
to the law—it necessarily presents an incomplete picture. A prosecutor
arguing within the scope of the evidence presented at the trial is at a
disadvantage when the defense does not do so. At present, it is unclear
how a prosecutor can respond to a plea for jury nullification, or how a jury
is to consider such a plea.
The “mirroring” principle presented in this Article is a coherent way
for the trial judge to manage the presentation of evidence and the
subsequent argument.18 It would also encourage the trial judge to think
ahead to the closing argument. In other words, if evidence about an issue
is not presented or is precluded from being presented during the trial, the
issue is not ripe for argument at the end of the trial. Under this principle,
the trial judge will ideally keep jury nullification out of the trial and
instruct the jury to decide the case based on admitted evidence and
applicable law. To the extent the trial judge wishes to crack open the door
to jury nullification, as some trial judges have, the mirroring principle
forces the judge to think about whether to allow a fight on jury
nullification on equal terms based on evidence presented at the trial. The
implications of doing this, which this Article explores, should give any
trial judge pause before allowing a bald appeal for jury nullification.

17. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997).
18. See infra Part III.
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THE LAW OF CLOSING ARGUMENT

A. The Prosecutor’s Charge
The Supreme Court’s words in Berger v. United States about the
heavy responsibilities and high purpose of a federal prosecutor have been
cited in thousands of published cases and appellate briefs, attaining “neariconic status for its description of the prosecutor’s duty to serve justice,
play by the rules, and not hit below the belt.”19 One of my former federal
prosecutor colleagues had the words printed and taped to his office door—
a daily inspiration to all who passed by. There has been no better
statement about the role of the public prosecutor, and it came in a case
involving improper closing argument by counsel for the government in a
criminal case:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.20

As an expression of the prosecutor’s purpose, it is perfect. As a guide to
argument during summations in a criminal trial, the distinction between
“hard blows” and “foul ones” begs the question of what is foul and what
is fair. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a more
recent case, has said that “[w]e start with certain fundamental verities. ‘A
prosecutor is permitted vigorous advocacy, so long as he does not stray
into forbidden terrain.’”21 Such verities, repeated in similar form
elsewhere,22 only warn the practitioner about the obvious—that there are
19. Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75
Years After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 178–79 (2010).
20. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
21. United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 976 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Palmariello v.
Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir. 1989)).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 874 F.3d 236, 252 (5th Cir. 2017) (“‘[W]e allow
prosecutors to use expressive language and “a bit of oratory and hyperbole” in
arguments.’ . . . At the same time, it is well-established that a prosecutor may ‘“not express his
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limits in closing argument. Such on the one hand–on the other hand
formulations leave the reader thirsting for more clarification.23 Courts
have reduced these general statements to some rules or maxims, such as
the rule against vouching for a witness’s credibility, but as will be
described below, these maxims have also been wanting.24 Elaboration on
these standards has been left to case-by-case adjudication of alleged
errors.25
The law of closing arguments in criminal cases is essentially directed
at prosecutors because, unlike a conviction, an acquittal cannot be
appealed.26 A wrongful acquittal obtained from improper argument by
defense counsel is as immune from appeal under the Double Jeopardy
clause as an acquittal fairly won.27 It is in this vein that the rules developed
for closing arguments are analyzed from the perspective of the prosecutor.
B. The Prime Directive: Arguing Within the Evidence
The purpose of this Article is not to canvass all of the rules governing
closing arguments, but to concentrate on a couple which have been applied
badly or are simply misconceived. It is sensible to first examine the rule
that the prosecutor (and defense counsel) should not argue facts outside
the evidence introduced in court.28 This is the most basic rule of closing
argument because it flows from the central assumption of our legal
system: that the outcome of the case is to be determined based on the
evidence presented in court at trial, judged against the legal standards

personal opinion on the merits of the case or the credibility of witnesses.”’” (quoting United
States v. Boyd, 773 F.3d 637, 645 (5th Cir. 2014))).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 1979) (using a series of
general oppositional statements to define prosecutor’s duty such as “[a] prosecutor can be
vigorous without being venomous”).
24. See generally Richard Collin Mangrum, I Believe, the Golden Rule, Send a Message,
and Other Improper Closing Arguments, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 521 (2015) (discussing twelve
principles concerning restrictions on closing arguments).
25. Peter W. Agnes, Jr., An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: A
Collaborative Approach to Eliminate Improper Closing Arguments, 87 MASS. L. REV. 33, 36
(2002).
26. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
27. See Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1300; see also Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 326
(2013) (holding an acquittal based on error of law induced by the defendant himself still enjoys
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
28. See Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 839 N.E.2d 298, 301–02 (Mass. 2005); see also
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 7 N.E.3d 424, 444 (Mass. 2014) (“Argument based on facts not in
evidence is improper.”); Commonwealth v. Storey, 391 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Mass. 1979) (“[I]t
is . . . beyond dispute that a prosecutor commits error when he uses closing argument to argue
or suggest facts not previously introduced in evidence.”).
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supplied by the trial judge.29 As one commentator has put it, “When we,
the inhabitants of the United States, want to resolve a legal dispute, we
have a trial. . . . We have relied on trials for our entire history as a
nation.”30 Our entire books of state and federal rules of both criminal and
civil procedure, our rules of evidence, and the guarantees of the
Constitution of the United States concerning the rights of the accused all
presuppose the existence of such a trial,31 as opposed to say, one of its
predecessors, trial by battle.32 Having made the trial the central event of
our legal process in criminal cases, it would be rather illogical to allow
lawyers to argue facts that have not been brought into this carefully
constructed proceeding.
This rule, which I will call the “prime directive” because it flows from
this first principle of how guilt and innocence is to be determined in our
legal system, does not restrict the prosecutor to a mere recitation of the
evidence. The prosecutor is allowed to draw fair inferences from the
evidence, to refer to the jury’s experience and common sense, and to use
“‘analogy, example and hypothesis’” in aid of his or her argument.33 This
rule against arguing outside the evidence is straightforward to apply
because the latitude given to the advocate to make an argument is distinct
from the prohibition against the advocate conjuring up facts not
introduced at the trial.

29. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986).
Central to the right to a fair trial . . . is the principle that “one accused of a crime is
entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the
evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.”
Id. (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)).
30. Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle. Trial by Argument., 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 261
(2003).
31. See generally Michael Sudman, The Jury Trial: History, Jury Selection, and the Use
of Demonstrative Evidence, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 172, 173–76 (1999) (tracing the
tradition of the jury trial and trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of
the United States Constitution).
32. See Rubin, supra note 30, at 261 (contrasting modern trials with the medieval practice
of trial by battle, whereby a legal dispute would be resolved through “armed conflict between
two opponents”).
33. Commonwealth v. Ridge, 916 N.E.2d 348, 368 (Mass. 2009) (quoting Leone v. Doran,
292 N.E.2d 19, 31–32 (Mass. 1973), modified on other grounds, 297 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. 1973));
see Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, Standard 3-6.8 to 3-6.9 (AM. BAR
ASS’N
2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/
ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/ [hereinafter Prosecution Function].
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C. The Rules Against Vouching and Personal Opinion
1.

Vouching: A Solid Core and Ambiguous Outer Layer

The rules against vouching and expressions of personal opinion are
separate, but they are treated together here because the misapplications of
these rules share similar features. In the classic form, improper vouching
occurs when the prosecutor uses the prestige of his position or office to
assure the jury the credibility of the government’s witnesses or other
evidence,34 such as when the prosecutor assures the jury the police are
telling the truth because he knows the officers and works with them. 35 A
prosecutor who argues for the credibility of police officers because they
would not “put their pensions . . . on the line” to make a false case against
a defendant is guilty of improper vouching because he is lending the
prestige of the police department to the officers’ testimony. 36 Similarly,
vouching occurs when the prosecutor assures the jury that the police
would not invent a case against the defendant because the police have so
many real drug cases to investigate,37 or when the prosecutor tells the jury
that the government would not put witnesses on the stand if they were
lying.38
This rule—and these obvious examples of vouching—are best
understood as stemming from the restrictions of the “prime directive”
discussed above. In a true case of vouching, the prosecutor is taking the
jury outside the evidence introduced at trial.39 If the prosecutor vouches
for a police witness by noting his familiarity with the witness, he is
invoking other cases and other sets of facts not relevant to the case against
the particular defendant on trial. The defense is ill-equipped to challenge
these assurances because it would know little about the entire course of
dealings between the prosecutor and the witness. For example, putting an
officer’s pension or job on the line necessarily raises questions about what
the rules are for when an officer might lose her pension or job.40 These
34. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Proper and Improper Closing Argument, 26 CRIM. JUST. 62,
63 (2011).
35. Agnes, supra note 25, at 43 n.87 (noting the temptation of prosecutors to vouch for
the credibility of police officers they know well in drug cases).
36. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 629 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (Mass. 1994) (alteration in original).
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gallego, 542 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 556 (1st Cir. 1987).
39. Mangrum, supra note 24, at 539 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 133
(3d Cir. 2012)) (noting that vouching occurs when prosecutor assures the jury of the credibility
based on her “‘personal knowledge or by other information’” not contained in the record).
40. Kelly, 629 N.E.2d at 1001–02 (explaining the impropriety of a prosecutor’s comments
at closing argument suggesting that officers had risked their pensions by testifying).
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rules are collateral to the issues in the trial. Likewise, an argument that
invokes the scourge of drugs in the community at large is not pertinent to
whether a particular drug defendant committed the charged crime.41 In
each of these examples of improper vouching, the closing argument did
not mirror the evidence at trial.42 The harm from such vouching is
apparent. Imagine for a moment the introduction of evidence and crossexamination on these topics of argument—past cases, past dealings
between the prosecutor and police officers, pensions, and the overall drug
problem in the community—which would be necessary to make it a fair
fight. The trial would be sidetracked with, for example, a debate on just
how drugs are affecting a particular community—the kind of complicated
policy dispute that a trial is ill-equipped to resolve, let alone entertain, for
the purpose of illuminating the issue of the officer’s credibility.43
If courts found violations of the rule against vouching only when the
prosecutor argued outside the evidence, then the boundary between proper
and improper argument would be clear. However, some courts have found
vouching when it is plain that the prosecutor has done nothing more than
argue inferences about evidence that was introduced at trial.44 In some
formulations, vouching can occur even when the prosecutor argues facts
adduced during trial but expresses a personal belief about a witness’s
credibility or the evidence.45
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has gone
further by stating that impermissible vouching can occur even where the
prosecutor did not (a) “suggest that he had special knowledge about the
witness[’s] credibility,” (b) indicate that special circumstances like the
witness’s plea agreement guaranteed that the witness was credible or (c)
express his personal belief about the witness’s truthfulness.46

41. See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir. 1991) (providing one
example of many cases condemning “war on drugs” rhetoric in closing arguments). The Solivan
court observed that this language is “designed to divert rather than focus the jury upon the
evidence.” Id. (citing United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 1982)).
42. See, e.g., Gallego, 542 N.E.2d at 325 (“Here the prosecutor departed from this case,
where she belonged, to invoke supposed facts which were not only extraneous but carried the
emotional charge of an overwhelming drug menace.”); see also Kelly, 629 N.E.2d at 1002
(finding that the argument about pensions went outside the evidence found at trial).
43. See, e.g., Gallego, 542 N.E.2d at 325 (including an argument about the drug problem
generally in Boston).
44. See, e.g., People v. Knapp, 624 N.W.2d 227, 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
an argument that the victim’s testimony was honest based on the evidence introduced during
the trial was deemed to be vouching).
45. See Medwed, supra note 6, at 919; see also Mangrum, supra note 24, at 539.
46. United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 772 (1st Cir. 1996).
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Nonetheless, the following prosecutor’s statement, “what they have done
is testified truthfully” (referring to witnesses at the trial), was deemed to
be “inappropriate,” albeit not reversible error.47
This expansive notion of vouching ensnared another prosecutor when
the First Circuit found that statements made in response to attacks on the
credibility of the government’s witnesses “may have crossed the line into
improper vouching.”48 The statement “the government suggests . . . that
they were up there telling the truth,” was held not to have impacted the
fairness of the trial and did not constitute plain error.49 The First Circuit
has also admitted that “[t]he line between the legitimate argument that a
witness’s testimony is credible and improper ‘vouching’ is often a hazy
one.”50 When it said that the prosecutor’s fairly subdued, logical
“statement that ‛[t]he testimony of the witnesses in this case is well
corroborated . . . [a]nd as a result, you know that the witness’s testimony
is true’—fell in the grey area.”51
Commonwealth v. Caillot demonstrates the difficulty in applying a
rule that conflates the prohibition against vouching with the rule against
expressions of personal belief.52 In this case, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court stated its general rule that “[a] prosecutor engages in
improper vouching if he ‘expresses a personal belief in the credibility of
a witness, or indicates that he . . . has knowledge independent of the
evidence before the jury.’”53 Caillot held, however, that the challenged
statement—“[w]hat [the witness] did was he told the truth based on the
evidence in this case, based on what could be corroborated”—would have
been understood by the jury as an argument that the witness’s testimony
was credible because it was corroborated by evidence admitted at the
trial.54 As a result, it was not improper. The court did say that the “better
course” would have been to avoid using the phrase, “he told the truth.”55
Although Caillot did not suggest a substitute phrasing, the prosecutor was
justified in arguing that the witness told the truth, and a slightly different

47. Id. (alteration in original).
48. United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 751 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Wihbey, 75 F.3d at
771–73).
49. Id.
50. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993).
51. Id. (alterations in original).
52. Commonwealth v. Caillot, 909 N.E.2d 1, 14–15 (Mass. 2009).
53. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 693 N.E.2d 158,
172 (Mass. 1998)).
54. Id. at 14–15.
55. Id. at 15.
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formulation with the same meaning would have been, it seems, entirely
proper.56
The fine distinctions in cases like these show the difficulty in defining
a rule against vouching when it is expanded beyond the logic of the prime
directive. Vouching that goes outside the evidence at trial represents a
well-defined core to the rule. Other vouching infractions exist in a “grey
area,”57 in which courts are reluctant to reverse convictions where it is
clear that the prosecutor was guilty of, at most, inartful phrasing that did
not unfairly affect the trial.58
This “grey area” of vouching is often subsumed within the separate
rule against statements of personal belief. For the sake of understanding
this often murky area of the law, it would be best if the vouching rule were
confined to vouching based on facts or reputation known outside the
courtroom.59 Statements about the credibility of witnesses or the strength
of the government’s case that are based on facts known inside the
courtroom are better analyzed separately, as the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Standards for the Prosecution Function do.60 Such
statements, whether they are deemed to be improper or not, should be
tested against the rule that prohibits injecting personal opinions into
closing argument.
2.

The Rule Against Personal Opinion

Courts, commentators, and the American Bar Association have
consistently articulated a distinct rule against the expression of personal
opinions, separate and apart from arguing outside the evidence and
vouching.61 It has been left to case-by-case adjudication to determine

56. Id.
57. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993).
58. See Agnes, supra note 25, at 34–35 (noting the reluctance of courts to reverse for
certain types of closing argument errors).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 823 (1st Cir. 1987) (no improper
vouching where “[t]he prosecutor did not ‘place the prestige of the government behind the
witness’ nor indicate that ‘information not presented to the jury supports the testimony.’”
(quoting United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1983))).
60. Prosecution Function, supra note 33, Standard 3-6.8(b) (“The prosecutor should not
argue in terms of counsel’s personal opinion, and should not imply special or secret knowledge
of the truth or of witness credibility.”).
61. See Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Arguments,
70 OKLA. L. REV. 887, 902 (2018); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32,
40–41 (1st Cir. 2012) (distinguishing the rule against personal opinion and the question of
whether counsel’s argument implies knowledge unknown to the jury); United States v. Auch,
187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999) (articulating prohibitions against personal opinion and
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what this prohibition adds to the law of closing argument.62 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals has said that the prosecutor “may discuss the
evidence, the warrantable inferences, the witnesses, and their
credibility. . . . [But h]e is not to interject his personal beliefs.”63 This
formulation of the rule is not uncommon; courts generally state that the
prosecutor may comment on evidence but may not offer a personal
opinion about the evidence.64 But how is this to be done?
The rule against personal opinion is frequently implicated when the
prosecutor comments on the credibility of witnesses.65 These comments,
unless made disingenuously or without any reflection by the prosecutor
on whether she believes them (which would be unethical),66 do reflect her
personal opinions.67 In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor is allowed to
tread a narrow path between suggesting that certain witnesses are worthy
of belief, if those suggestions do not appear to be the overt opinion of the
prosecutor.68 In other jurisdictions, the artificiality of this distinction has
been rejected in favor of a flat rule against commenting on a witness’s
credibility.69 Both versions of this rule, as discussed below, seem to be
unworkable.

referring to facts outside the evidence); Prosecution Function, supra note 33, Standard 3-6.8 to
3-6.10.
62. See United States v. Farnkoff, 535 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1976). In one case, the First
Circuit found error for an “indiscreet” statement even though it did not refer to facts outside the
evidence. Id. The statement “I suggest to you, I ask you to consider these things, come to the
decision which I think you should come to, based upon the evidence, that the defendant is guilty
as charged” was improper because “[w]e have long put ourselves on record as disagreeing with
those circuits which permit the prosecutor to add the weight of his own—or the government’s—
thumb to the scales of justice quite apart from any . . . connotation or implication of knowledge
of additional facts.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 453
(1st Cir. 1970)).
63. Cotter, 425 F.2d at 452.
64. See Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1307–08; see also Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 921 N.E.2d
968, 979 (Mass. 2010) (“The prosecutor should not have injected his personal observations or
beliefs . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Finstein, 687 N.E.2d 638, 641 n.1 (Mass. 1997) (explaining
that the trial judge gave specific guidance to counsel before closing arguments on how to avoid
expressions of personal opinion).
65. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d at 40–41; Auch, 187 F.3d at 131–32.
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
67. James W. Gunson, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between “Personal
Opinion” and Proper Argument?, 46 ME. L. REV. 241, 271 & n.176 (1994) (noting that “the
prosecutor believes in the strength of the case” and that the criminal legal “process reinforces
the prosecutor’s belief in the defendant’s guilt”).
68. See infra Sections I.C.3–4.
69. See infra Section I.C.5.
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The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Young,
confronted what it deemed to be improper arguments by both defense
counsel and the federal prosecutor.70 The prosecutor responded to
inflammatory rhetoric by defense counsel by engaging in a number of
missteps: attacking defense counsel, putting untoward pressure on the jury
by telling its members to “do your job,” and offering his “personal
impressions.”71 The Young court found this conduct to be completely
inappropriate, but not grounds for reversal.72 The Court acknowledged
that “[t]he line separating acceptable from improper advocacy is not easily
drawn; there is often a gray zone.”73 The Court made it clear, however,
that there had been error,74 perhaps because there were several species of
closing argument errors. The Court found it easy to conclude that the
prosecutor had violated the existing ABA standard, which prohibited the
prosecutor from expressing “‘his or her personal belief or opinion as to
the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the
defendant’”75 since the prosecutor had explicitly offered his “personal
impressions” about the evidence and the defendant’s guilt.76 Young made
no attempt to signal whether the prosecutor could have properly given, in
substance, the same view of the evidence without labeling them “personal
impressions.”77
3.

Attempts by Federal Courts to Give Meaning to the Rule
Against Personal Opinions

A number of federal courts have taken the rule against personal
opinions to be a matter of phraseology.78 In United States v. Nersesian,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the
prosecutor had erred by repeatedly using “I” statements, that is, prefacing
remarks about the evidence with, “I believe on the basis of what you’ve

70. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
71. Id. at 17, 32.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 34–35.
75. Id. at 8 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1980)).
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1387 (6th Cir. 1994) (drawing a
distinction, although it was not dispositive on the facts, between “I suggest” and “I believe”).
This section of the Article discusses in some depth several examples of this phenomenon from
the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits.
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heard.”79 Neresian also disapproved of the prosecutor posing questions
such as “was [the witness] correct?” and answering that question in the
affirmative.80 Acknowledging that the “[o]ccasional use of . . . rhetorical
devices is simply fair argument,”81 the Second Circuit admonished
prosecutors to use different language to make the same points:
It is a perfectly acceptable practice for a prosecutor to use language in
addressing the jury such as “you are free to conclude,” “you may
perceive that,” “it is submitted that,” or “a conclusion on your part may
be drawn,” to mention only a few examples of unobjectionable
phraseology. It is obligatory for prosecutors to find careful ways of
inviting jurors to consider drawing argued inferences and conclusions
and yet to avoid giving the impression that they are conveying their
personal views to the jurors.82

Neresian was a stand-alone “personal belief” rule violation: the prosecutor
was arguing the evidence and was not vouching. Neresian acknowledged
that compliance with the rule was a matter of “phraseology” and not
substance. Using the passive voice “it is submitted” was proper but
prefacing a sentence with “I submit” was not.83
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has, in similar
fashion, sketched out a series of fine distinctions applying the rule against
personal opinions where the prosecutor has not otherwise committed error
by addressing facts outside the evidence. Conclusory statements that the
government has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—
in the context of having argued the evidence introduced at trial—have
been found to be error or very nearly error.84 When accompanied by the
phrasing, “I think,” such a statement has been deemed to be a statement
of personal belief.85 The First Circuit has noted that substituting “I think”
with “[t]he government submits” would have fixed the problem.86

79. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1327–28 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis
omitted).
80. Id. at 1327 (alteration in original).
81. Id. at 1328 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173,
1181 (2d Cir. 1981)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1330. Acknowledging the degree of this violation, the Second Circuit held that
the closing argument errors, despite being numerous (the defense counted sixty-five) did not
warrant reversal of the convictions. Id. at 1327.
84. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993).
85. See id.
86. Id.
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A prosecutor was found to have gone “too far” with first person
statements like “I think her testimony was very clear” and “[i]t seems to
me, and I submit to you, that [the witness] is right on the money. Same
guy, just thinner.”87 In this instance, the court noted the tension with
another First Circuit case in which it said, “although it is the jury’s job to
draw the inferences, there is nothing improper in the Government’s
suggesting which inferences should be drawn.”88 The First Circuit did not
attempt to elaborate on the distinction between properly suggesting what
inferences should be drawn and improperly suggesting that a witness was
“clear” or “right on the money.” These latter statements, found to be error,
were clearly within the context of an argument that a trial witness had
accurately identified the defendant in a photo array.89 The critical factor,
it seems, was the use of the first person in the statement.
The First Circuit has, however, found error even where prosecutorial
arguments were not couched in the first person. In one case, a prosecutor’s
argument that a witness had told the truth and had been an honest man in
court was deemed to be improper personal opinion, even though, as the
court acknowledged, it was in the context of defense arguments that the
witness had lied.90 A prosecutor who asked and answered his own
question—“Was [the passenger] credible? Was he honest? Of course, he
was . . . .”—was held to have crossed the line in arguing for a witness’s
credibility.91 Similarly, a prosecutor who claimed that “John Fitzgerald
gave you honest, candid, truthful testimony” was found to be in error.92
The First Circuit acknowledged that the statement was “not expressly a
personal opinion and could have been intended, and perhaps understood,
as merely a description of what the prosecutor was urging the jury to
conclude based on the evidence. And, in fairness, it followed a rather
strong attack on Fitzgerald’s honesty in defense counsel’s own closing
argument.”93 In the First Circuit, it appears that straightforward assertions
of a witness’s credibility can transform an argument about the evidence
into untoward expressions of personal opinion.
In each of these examples, the First Circuit found error, but not
reversible error. In each case, the court analyzed the potential harm in
terms of whether the prosecutor had suggested that he had knowledge of
87. United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted).
88. Id. (quoting United States v. Mount, 896 F.3d 612, 625 (1st Cir. 1990)).
89. See id.
90. See United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999).
91. United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (alteration in
original).
92. United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted).
93. Id.
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facts outside the record or had tried to use the prestige of the prosecutor’s
office to bolster the argument. In each case, these elements were lacking.
Without these substantive concerns underlying these findings of
prosecutorial misconduct, it is difficult to discern an organizing principle
that justifies this rule. Adding to the ambiguity in this area, the First
Circuit has allowed the government to suggest inferences to the jury,
which seem to permit the government to interpret and draw conclusions
about a witness’s credibility or whether the government has met its burden
of proof.94 For example, in arguing that a defendant knew he had
transported stolen documents, a prosecutor asked and answered his own
question: “Did Mr. Mount know that they were stolen when he brought
them to Boston? I suggest to you that the answer, again, is clearly yes.”95
The prosecutor later prefaced his review of the evidence with, “How do
we know that he stole the documents?”96 Thus, there was the use of the
first person (“I” and “we”) and a conclusory statement of guilt—
formulations which have been condemned in other cases.97 Of course, the
argument was tied to the evidence at trial, but then again, other similar
arguments tied to the evidence have been censured by the First Circuit as
prosecutorial error.98
A series of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit also demonstrate the fitful experience of federal courts
attempting to allow argument about the credibility of witnesses while also
giving stand-alone meaning to the rule against statements of personal
belief. A 1991 case, United States v. Freisinger, ruled that a prosecutor’s
use in closing argument of the phrases “I submit that” and “I submit to
you,” even though “couch[ed] . . . in less brazen language,” were still
improper statements of personal opinion.99 Freisinger also disapproved
of the assertion “[t]hey came here and told the truth.”100 The Eighth
Circuit counseled that “[t]his kind of argumentation is not only improper,
it is unnecessary. Counsel can just as easily argue issues of credibility

94. See, e.g., United States v. Barbosa, 666 F.2d 704, 709 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[T]he
government told you [what] it was going to prove. And that, in fact, is what the government
proved.”).
95. United States v. Mount, 896 F.2d 612, 625 (1st Cir. 1990).
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Carpenter, 736 F.3d 619, 632 (1st Cir. 2013) (allowing multiple
statements of “that’s fraud” as “permissible comments on the evidence in the case”).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2010); United States
v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1993).
99. See United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 386−87 (8th Cir. 1991).
100. Id. at 386.
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without injecting personal views.”101 Freisinger maintained that these
first-person formulations and the conclusory statement of credibility
“suggests that the government may know something that the jury does
not,”102 but it made no attempt to articulate how, beyond the phraseology,
the prosecutor was arguing outside the evidence. If the solution was, as
the Second Circuit suggested in Neresian, to switch from the first-person
active voice to the passive voice, then it is hard to see how the prosecutor
was arguing outside the evidence.
However justified, Freisinger set a strict standard in how a prosecutor
chooses her words. Yet, the Eighth Circuit backtracked significantly from
that approach in its 2004 and 2009 decisions.103 In each case, the
prosecutor used the words “I submit” to preface remarks about the
evidence.104 In the 2004 decision, United States v. Beaman, the Eighth
Circuit found that this formulation, even though used eighteen times in
summation, was not plain error.105 In a more nuanced reading of the rules
against vouching and personal opinion, it said that using the “I submit”
language was “a questionable practice because, depending on the context,
it may either properly suggest how the jury should view the trial evidence,
or improperly suggest that the government knows more than the jury has
heard.”106 Because the prosecutor was “referring to testimony and other
trial evidence,” it was not an obvious error, leaving unsaid whether it was
error at all.107
The 2009 decision, United States v. Bentley, went further in removing
the automatic opprobrium given to first person statements. It stated that
while the use of the phrases “‘we know’ and ‘I submit.’ . . . has been often
criticized (and discouraged) by this court and others, it is not always
improper.”108 Acknowledging the per se disapproval given in Freisinger
and the milder warning given in Beaman, the Eighth Circuit in Bentley
said that this wording “is only improper when it suggests that the
government has special knowledge of evidence not presented to the jury,
carries an implied guarantee of truthfulness, or expresses a personal

101. Id.
102. Id. at 386–87.
103. United States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 803 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Beaman,
361 F.3d 1061, 1061 (8th Cir. 2004).
104. Bentley, 561 F.3d at 811; Beaman, 361 F.3d at 1065.
105. Beaman, 361 F.3d at 1065.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Bentley, 561 F.3d at 811.
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opinion about credibility.”109 The Bentley court saw no problem with a
chart used by the prosecutor to show the “ten things we learned during
th[e] trial.”110 The prosecutor told the jury that “we know” a certain fact
and then explained how each fact was based on evidence introduced
during the trial.111 Using the words “I submit” to discuss the trial evidence
was likewise deemed not to be error.112 Only the conclusory statement,
“‘I submit he’s guilty of all crimes,’ approaches the line between proper
and improper,” and it did not meet the plain error standard.113
Subsequent decisions by the Eighth Circuit seem to have completed
the evolution from a rule meant to censure certain forms of expression, to
a far more pragmatic rule that looks to context and whether the argument
strays from the evidence or seeks to leverage the prestige of the
prosecutor’s office.114 Thus, using an “I” statement to say that a witness
told the truth is now proper in the Eighth Circuit where the statement is
simply a way of arguing the evidence: “I think it was very clear that he
did as best he could to remember the dates, and times, the amounts. And
you’re the judges of his credibility, but based on that testimony, we ask
that you believe him.”115 The allowance of such a statement can only be
understood as the triumph of contextualized analysis over wooden rules
focused on the form and not the substance of the prosecutor’s argument.
4.

The “L” Word in the Federal Courts: Per Se Misconduct or Fair
Commentary

The use in closing arguments of the “L” word, meaning “lie,” “lying,”
or “liar,” has given rise to particular rules that vary across the federal
circuits. Stemming from the general rule against expressing personal
opinions, the “liar” rule illustrates how courts have attempted to regulate
closing argument both by the denomination of forbidden words and
phrases and by a more contextual analysis.
The First Circuit has adopted, and continues holding to, a per se rule
that the prosecutor cannot call the defendant, or the defendant’s witnesses,

109. Id. at 812.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See United States v. Golliher, 820 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding use of firstperson pronouns did not make statements into expressions of personal belief); United States v.
Sevilla-Acosta, 746 F.3d 900, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the challenge to the prosecutor’s
argument that used an analogy and first-person narrative to argue the evidence).
115. Sevilla-Acosta, 746 F.3d at 906.
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liars or argue that they lied in their testimony before the jury or in out-ofcourt statements admitted into evidence. In United States v. RodriguezEstrada, the defendant was accused of a smorgasbord of crimes of
dishonesty, and he was convicted of embezzlement, withholding
information from a bankruptcy court, and false statements.116 The
prosecutor argued that he was a “crook” and twice called the defendant a
“liar.”117 The First Circuit did not elaborate on whether or not the labels
were applied in the context of arguing the evidence of the alleged massive
fraud, but said, “[t]hat these statements were improper is so clear as not to
brook serious discussion.”118
In 2018, faced with an invitation to revisit its per se rule against the
“L” word, in light of the different approach taken by other circuits, the
First Circuit held firm and expanded the prohibition to other witnesses
called by the defendant.119 Thus, it was misconduct to say that the
defendant, who gave inconsistent stories, was a “good storyteller” and that
his testimony was “malarkey.”120 It was also error to say that the defense
witness who changed his testimony during the trial on a crucial point was
an “unmitigated liar.”121 The court refused to “condone” the use of “liar,”
and it indicated that the use of other wording (“malarkey”) did not help.122
The First Circuit, in finding the prosecutorial error harmless, noted that
the use of these terms “were based on the inconsistency and
outlandishness of [the defendant’s and the defendant’s witness’] stories,
making it less likely that the jury would infer that the prosecutor had
‘private knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.’”123 This made it clear that
the violation was simply the use of the pejorative words, not any concern
that the prosecutor was arguing outside the evidence, which ostensibly
was the rationale for the “L” word rule in the first place.124
In acknowledging that not all federal courts have adopted a per se rule
against certain words, the First Circuit noted that many circuits are united

116. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 154–55 (1st Cir. 1989).
117. Id. at 158.
118. Id.
119. United States v. Saad, 888 F.3d 561, 569 (1st Cir. 2018).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2011)).
124. See United States v. Garcia, 818 F.2d 136, 143–44 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[W]e think a
prosecutor would be well advised to avoid directly accusing a defendant of lying—since jurors
could believe the government has knowledge outside the evidence about the defendant’s
veracity . . . .”).
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in recognizing the context in which closing arguments are made.125 This
was a curious way to attempt to find common ground since the First
Circuit’s “L” word rule is meant to de-contextualize the analysis by
establishing a prohibition that applies even where the evils of arguing
outside the evidence or vouching are plainly absent.126 For its part, the
Second Circuit has held that arguing that the testimony of a defense expert
was “built on the lies of the defendant,”127 and that the expert’s process
was “garbage in, garbage out” and did “not come within hailing distance
of” constituting reversible error.128 It affirmed the use of the word “lie”
so long as it is not inflammatory or intemperate and so long as the
prosecutor is arguing the accuracy of underlying, contested facts.129 The
Eighth Circuit found no misconduct in a fraud case when the prosecutor
said that the defendant “exhibits all the signs of a liar” and accused the
defendant of “still making false representations to [the jury] today.”130
Other circuits have found the use of the word “lie” or its derivatives is not
per se improper.131
5.

How Two Jurisdictions Have Given Expansive Scope to the
Rule Against Expressions of Personal Belief

The preceding discussion of how federal courts have grappled with
the rule against personal opinions demonstrates the difficulty in
developing a workable reading of this prohibition. Two jurisdictions,
Maine and Kansas, have taken the rule to perhaps its logical conclusion:
a prohibition on arguing the credibility of the defendant or any other
witness.132 This approach does not attempt to square the rule against
personal opinions with the allowance of argument about the credibility of
witnesses. It eschews both the fraught exercise of picking through
forbidden and permitted phrases, as well as the fully contextualized
analysis based on compliance with the prime directive.

125. Saad, 888 F.3d at 570.
126. Id. at 571 (finding no prejudice because there was no suggestion the prosecutor had
suggested he had information unknown to the jury but still demining it inappropriate).
127. Brief for the United States of America at 50, United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1450), 2002 WL 32297937, at *50.
128. United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2002).
129. See id. at 255–56.
130. United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
cases in other circuits).
132. See Gunson, supra note 67, at 241–43; Steven Leben, Commenting on Credibility in
Kansas: A Constructive Criticism of State v. Pabst, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 871, 871 (2008).
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Maine: “My confusion is, what can we say?”133

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued three decisions in a ninemonth period during 1993 and 1994 which vacated convictions due, in
whole or in part, to what it found to be the expression of personal opinion
by prosecutors in closing argument.134 In two of the three cases, the
prosecutor also engaged in clearly improper cross-examination by asking
the testifying defendant whether one or more prosecution witnesses, who
offered different versions of events than the defendant, were lying.135 This
raised the question of whether the closing argument mis-steps, standing
alone, might have constituted harmless error, but the Maine court left no
doubt that the closing remarks were error.136
In State v. Tripp, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting
his nine-year old son.137 His son and an outcry witness described the
alleged rapes in detail, and the defendant took the stand and firmly denied
that these events took place.138 The defendant went further and suggested
a motive for the son to fabricate a story.139 During closing arguments,
both the prosecutor and the defense attorney noted the obvious conflict in
testimony and said that one of them, the defendant or the son, was lying,
with each advocate having a different view of who was lying.140 The
prosecutor also maintained that the son “told you the truth. He told you
what happened to him. He told you what his father did to him.”141 Tripp
held that by arguing both that the son was telling the truth and that the
defendant was lying, “the clear implication [was] that the prosecutor
believed that the victim told the truth but defendant lied.”142
State v. Steen, another sexual assault case, stated flatly that “it is
impermissible for a prosecutor to assert that the defendant lied on the
stand.”143 It cited a prior case, State v. Smith, in which the Maine court

133. Gunson, supra note 67, at 242 n.15 (quoting Jason Wolfe, Maine High Court Cracks
Down on Prosecutors’ Trial Remarks, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 8, 1994, at 8A).
134. See generally Robert W. Clifford, Identifying and Preventing Improper
Prosecutorial Comment in Closing Argument, 51 ME. L. REV. 241, 244–49 (1999).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 245–48 (suggesting that improper cross-examination was the more serious error
in two of the three cases).
137. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1319 (Me. 1994).
138. Id. at 1319.
139. Id. at 1321.
140. See id. at 1320–21.
141. Id. at 1321 (emphasis omitted).
142. Id.
143. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (Me. 1993).
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had offered a more nuanced, if elusive, view of the rule against personal
opinions:
Although the prosecutor may properly attack defendant’s credibility
by analyzing the evidence and highlighting absurdities or
discrepancies in defendant’s testimony, and may present his analysis
in summation with vigor and zeal, he may not properly convey to the
jury his personal opinion that a defendant is lying. 144

The combined effect of Steen and Tripp seemed to extinguish any daylight
that might have previously existed between properly attacking the
defendant’s credibility and improperly offering a personal opinion of the
defendant’s credibility. Any comment on whether the defendant’s
testimony was truthful was prohibited. Steen went further still by holding
that the prosecutor’s argument on the credibility of the defendant’s expert
witness was improper.145 By saying “I suggest to you, ladies and
gentlemen, that his opinion is based on $2,500, the money the defendant
paid him for his testimony,” the prosecutor had “clearly suggested” that
the expert had lied.146 The zone of protection from prosecutorial argument
thus expanded from the defendant himself to the defendant’s witnesses.
The third case, State v. Casella, was a 4-3 decision in a fraud case in
which the defendant testified.147 There was no claim of improper crossexamination. Instead, the prosecutor asserted in closing argument that the
defendant had lied in court just as he had lied to his victims in order to
obtain their money.148 The majority opinion counted forty-one times the
prosecutor had used the words lie, lying, and liar.149 It did not matter, as
the dissent pointed out, that this occurred all in reference to evidence
introduced about his fraudulent activities and the defendant’s in-court
testimony.150 Casella said, “[w]e have repeatedly held that it is improper
for a prosecutor to express an opinion on the credibility of a defendant.”151
The government contended on appeal that the attack on the defendant’s
credibility was permissible because “its closing argument was based on

144. State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983).
145. Steen, 623 A.2d at 149.
146. Id. at 149 (emphasis omitted). The prosecutor probably would have conceded that
he had been suggesting that the witness had given false testimony because it was influenced by
the $2,500 fee. See id.
147. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 121–22 (Me. 1993).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 121.
150. Id. at 125 (Roberts, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 122.
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the facts in evidence and thus was not improper.”152 The court disagreed.
In distinguishing a prior decision which had suggested that referring to the
defendant as an “admitted liar” was allowed, Casella said that such
commentary was appropriate only if the defendant himself had admitted,
on the stand, to lying.153 If the truthfulness of the defendant’s testimony
was a matter of dispute, then the prosecutor could not give his view of
whether the defendant had lied.154
These decisions caused consternation among prosecutors in Maine,155
prompting one elected District Attorney to ask, “My confusion is, what
can we say?”156 One commentator, although critical of the decisions,
recognized that the decisions had redefined the rule against personal
opinion in Maine.157 According to the commentator, the cases “place[d]
the prosecutor in the impossible position of being prohibited from
commenting either directly or implicitly on a testifying defendant’s
credibility,” even where the defendant had contradicted the government’s
witnesses.158 Justice Robert Clifford, who dissented in Tripp and Casella,
wrote an article analyzing these decisions and other closing argument
cases in Maine.159 While attempting to harmonize Steen, Tripp, and
Casella with prior decisions that allowed some room for argument on
matters of credibility of the defendant or his witnesses, Justice Clifford
recognized that this trilogy represented a different approach to the rule
against personal opinion.160 He suggested that the results could have
changed with some tweaking of the prosecutor’s phraseology, consistent
with many of the federal court decisions discussed above. In other words,
the prosecutor could argue that the defendant or a defense witness was
lying or that a government witness was truthful by saying, “‘I submit that

152. Id. at 123.
153. See id.
154. Id. (citing State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (Me. 1993)).
155. Clifford, supra note 134, at 241.
156. Gunson, supra note 67, at 242 n.15 (emphasis added).
157. See id. at 242–43.
158. Id. at 279.
159. See Clifford, supra note 134.
160. Id. at 242. Justice Clifford said, with some diplomacy, that,
[E]xcept in a few of its opinions, particularly Casella, and a 1983 case, State v.
Smith, when emphasis was placed on the pejorative language used by the
prosecutors without full consideration of the context in which the language was
used, the court has correctly addressed the cases that have come before it.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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a witness is not credible,’ or ‘I suggest that our witness is telling the
truth.’”161
While these distinctions in verbal formulation might have been
important to Justice Clifford, the logic of Steen, Tripp, and Casella
suggests that making minor changes to the form, but not the substance, of
the closing argument would be insufficient.162 Moreover, Casella had
batted away the government’s contention that the closing argument was
proper so long as it was grounded in the evidence introduced at trial.
Because “[i]t was for the jury, not the prosecutor, to determine which
witnesses were telling the truth,” the topic was off-limits.163 The rule
against personal opinion had clearly gone beyond the prohibition against
arguing outside the evidence and had been given independent significance
by prohibiting altogether remarks about the credibility of defense
witnesses.164
b.

Kansas:The end of argument for both sides?

The Kansas Supreme Court touched the apogee of restrictions on
closing argument when in 2000 it flatly stated “that it is improper for a
lawyer to comment on a witness’[s] credibility.”165 In that case, State v.
Pabst, the prosecutor contended in closing argument that the defendant,
who had testified on his own behalf in a murder trial, had lied.166 This
testimony was central to the case.167 Pabst admitted he shot his fiancée to
death but laid out a scenario that made the shooting into an accident.168
This contradicted the physical evidence in the case and formed the basis
for the prosecutor’s argument that the accident story was a fiction.169
After couching the accusation of lying in the first person—“I look into
each one of your eyes and I tell you he lied”—the defense objected, and

161. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
162. But see id. Ironically, the “I suggest” language would probably draw a rebuke among
courts that apply the rule against personal opinion as a rule of forbidden or allowable verbal
formulations. The use of the first person, standing alone, has proven fatal for several closing
arguments, as discussed above.
163. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123 (Me. 1993).
164. See id. (rejecting government’s argument that it was enough that the prosecutor
engaged in fair comment on the evidence).
165. State v. Pabst, 996 P.2d 321, 326 (Kan. 2000).
166. Id. at 324–26.
167. See Leben, supra note 132, at 872 (“[T]he key question for the jury to determine was
whether there was any shred of truth in anything that the defendant said had occurred.”).
168. Pabst, 996 P.2d at 324.
169. See id. at 324–26.
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the trial court sustained the objection.170 The prosecutor rephrased his
remarks by saying, “The State tells you he lied,” which the trial judge
permitted.171
The Kansas Supreme Court said the eleven references to the
defendant lying were prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial,
regardless of whether the remarks about lying were phrased in the first
person or third person.172 Pabst might have applied the rule against
personal opinion to reach this result by pointing to the use of the first
person, or it might have defined the prosecutor’s sin as simply using the
“L” word. Or, it might have applied the rule against vouching to find that
the assurance—“[w]e didn’t lie to you[, w]e didn’t hide anything”173—
had improperly placed the government’s witnesses and the government on
one righteous team. Instead, Pabst held that the prosecutor erred because
Kansas’s Rules of Professional Responsibility (which are based on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct) and the ABA’s Standards for
Prosecutors “clearly and unequivocally say that it is improper for a lawyer
to comment on a witness’[s] credibility.”174 It specifically overruled its
own precedent, State v. McClain, which had said, “[c]ounsel may
comment on the credibility of a witness where his remarks are based on
the facts in evidence.”175
This was the broadest possible holding, and because it was grounded
in the ethical rules applicable to all lawyers, it applies to criminal defense
lawyers. Pabst could have said that lawyers can comment on credibility
issues, but that those words, in this context, were personal opinions. By
removing the credibility of witnesses from the arena of closing argument,
Pabst avoided the spectacle of condemning one verbal formulation but
endorsing another formulation that says the same thing. Of course, it is
worth asking what is left of closing argument if the lawyers cannot address
whether the witnesses are telling the truth or not. In Pabst itself, what did
the Kansas Supreme Court think the lawyers were going to talk about in
their summations, if not the plausibility of the defendant’s accident
scenario? Pabst admitted that the defendant’s “credibility was crucial to
the case.”176
170. Id. at 325.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 325–26.
173. Id. at 325 (emphasis omitted).
174. Id. at 326.
175. Id. (quoting State v. McClain, 533 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Kan. 1975)).
176. Id. Yet, because it was so crucial, the Supreme Court of Kansas said it was important
for the prosecutor not to comment on it. Id. It claimed that the arguments about the defendant
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Pabst’s broad construction of the rule against personal opinion, if
taken seriously, would probably mean the end of closing argument as it
has long been practiced, a solution akin to curing the disease by killing the
patient. A Kansas intermediate appellate judge who has had to apply the
Pabst rule has written an article arguing that, in practice, the prohibition
against commenting on witness credibility is unworkable.177 At a
fundamental level, Pabst is inconsistent with the whole idea of a trial:
“Credibility is at the heart of any trial. If all of the witnesses agreed upon
all of the facts, no factual disputes would be submitted to a judge or
jury.”178 Moreover, the rule would prevent defense counsel from attacking
the credibility of the government’s witnesses, an outcome that would seem
to infringe on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.179 In practice, the
“trial judge’s task of policing Pabst violations in closing argument in the
absence of objections is not one that can be handled without error.”180
Post-Pabst, it was held in State v. Miller, a murder case, to be misconduct
for the prosecutor to refer to what “the killer” did in a sequence of events
leading up to the death in question.181 In a case decided a year later,
repeated suggestions that the defendant was “the killer” were held not to
be error.182
If Pabst held the promise of establishing a reasonably clear rule by
cordoning off an entire area of the trial from comment, it does not appear
that the promise has been fulfilled. Trials in Kansas continue to place the
credibility of witness testimony in front of the jury183 and lawyers are
compelled to address the elephant in the room.184

lying amounted to “unsworn testimony,” adding that “[s]tating facts not in evidence is clearly
improper.” Id. To characterize the prosecutor’s remarks as both untoward opinion and factual
testimony was a head-scratching turn of logic.
177. Leben, supra note 132, at 871.
178. Id. at 879.
179. Id. at 893–96.
180. Id. at 897.
181. Id. at 897–98; see State v. Miller, 163 P.3d 267, 292–95 (Kan. 2007).
182. Leben, supra note 132, at 897–98; see State v. Scott, 183 P.3d 801, 823 (Kan. 2008).
183. In State v. Elnicki, 105 P.3d 1222, 1233–34 (Kan. 2005), the defendant’s version of
events at issue during a sexual assault trial, where the defendant gave mutually exclusive
versions of events, warranted reversal because the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s
inconsistent statement as a “fairy tale,” “fabrication,” and a “tall tale.” Id. at 133–34. In State
v. Hernandez, No. 107,288, 2013 WL 4046398, at *1, *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2013), the
court allowed the following argument despite the ruling in Pabst: “[H]e’s counting on you not
to believe them because after all, they are just children. But you should. And if you do, you
will find him guilty.” Id.
184. Leben, supra note 132, at 879.
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II. JURY NULLIFICATION IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
This Article turns to another elephant in the room, jury nullification,
which will be defined for purposes of this discussion to be a jury verdict
that is not based on, and is contrary to, the evidence introduced during the
trial and the law as explained to the jury by the trial judge.185 In criminal
cases, a jury nullification argument is usually understood as a defense
argument for acquittal in spite of the evidence.186 Jury nullification often
creeps into the trial during closing argument because the prior stages of
the trial are confined to matters introduced into evidence and the law
explained by the judge.187
This section will explore, through a few examples, the conundrum
prosecutors are faced with when they confront a jury nullification
argument by the defense. This conundrum helps to explain the “why”
behind some forms of prosecutorial argument that are later deemed error.
A. The Ambiguous Place of Jury Nullification in Criminal Cases
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
criminal defendants are entitled to jury trials for felonies, and the judge
cannot direct a verdict in favor of the government, even if the evidence is
overwhelming on one or all of the counts.188 As a result, jurors have the
unreviewable power to ignore the law and the facts and render a verdict
aligned to their sense of justice, or for some other reason.189 It has long
been established that jurors cannot be forced to explain their verdicts, and
they cannot be punished for what the court or anyone else believes is even
a manifestly erroneous decision.190 The government has no ability to
appeal or obtain a retrial where a verdict was erroneous.191 On the other

185. See, e.g., United States v. Leach, 632 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980).
186. See Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice
or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 132 (1993).
187. See Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: The Anti-Atticus, 65 ALA. LAW. 110, 114
(2004) (describing how defense attorneys attempt to subtly argue for jury nullification in
opening or closing statements).
188. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
189. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 131–32.
190. Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 467, 498–99 (2001).
191. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 210 (1984) (holding that a capital sentencing
proceeding was deemed a trial and subject to the Double Jeopardy clause, even where acquittal
in the sentencing proceeding was based on legal error); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
352 (1975) (“A system permitting review of all claimed legal errors would have symmetry to
recommend it and would avoid the release of some defendants who have benefited from
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hand, juries are, with the exception of a few state courts, told that they
have a duty to follow the law as it is given to them, and to apply the facts
to that law, based on the evidence admitted at trial.192 They are not told
about their power to nullify, nor are they given instructions to guide them
should they decide to entertain nullification.193
Thus, as one commentator has said, “[J]ury nullification ultimately
exists in the ‘twilight’ between judicial condemnation and permission—
judges strongly denounce the practice but are unable to control it.”194 It
has been clear since the 1895 case, Sparf v. United States, that judges, not
juries, decide questions of law.195 Thus, the defendant in Sparf had no
right to an instruction on a lesser-included offense unless the law
supported it.196 Federal courts have been consistent that the defendant has
no right to a verdict based on jury nullification,197 or even the right to
pursue such a verdict.198
To say that the defendant has no right to jury nullification still leaves
the possibility that the jury may choose to grant a nullification verdict. It
is in this realm that defendants and their lawyers do, rather routinely, seek
to inject the possibility of jury nullification into trials. As one experienced
Alabama judge has written:
Many defense attorneys argue for nullification during opening or
closing statements. Is it permissible for the jury to be made aware of
its power to nullify? Most competent defense attorneys will figure a
way to get this issue in front of the jury without going so far as to be

instructions or evidentiary rulings that are unduly favorable to them. But we have rejected this
position . . . .”).
192. United States v. Desmarais, 938 F.2d 347, 350 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that the jury
must be instructed to follow the law); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir.
1969) (asserting that the jury has duty to apply the law and should be instructed to do so); Robert
P. Lawry, The Moral Obligation of the Juror to the Law, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 137, 138 n.3
(2007).
193. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 131–33; see also United States v. Carr,
424 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir.
1996)) (noting that every federal circuit agrees that there is no right for jury to be instructed on
nullification).
194. Kimberly Del Frate, Comment, The Elephant in the Room: Attorney Accountability
for Jury Nullification Arguments in Criminal Trials, 52 CAL. W. L. REV. 163, 172 (2016).
195. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99–101 (1895).
196. See id. at 63–64.
197. See, e.g., Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105–06
(11th Cir. 1983).
198. See United States v. Thompson, No. 99-41007, 2001 WL 498430, at *16 (5th Cir.
Apr. 9, 2001); Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994).
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held in contempt of court. Such arguments as those aimed at evoking
sympathy for the client or reviewing the historical role of the jury or
even as “send a message” may be subtle enough to escape detection
or judicial consequences. A defense attorney who, based on the facts,
has no defense will usually take a plea bargain. If that is not possible,
he may throw his client’s case on the mercy of the jury.
Then the client’s best or only defense is to urge the jury to nullify.
Blatant tactics would evoke possible ethical considerations and may
also result in contempt. The defense attorney can still walk a thin line
and weave the nullification notion throughout his case. That notion is
that even though his client did the deed, it would be an injustice to
convict him.199

Other practitioners and scholars have noted the frequency of appeals to
jury nullification in criminal trials.200 In my nearly twenty years as a
federal prosecutor in the District of Columbia and Massachusetts, I have
noticed that nearly every criminal trial has, to a lesser or greater degree,
an element of appeal to jury nullification.
A federal trial court may act in three possible ways. First, the trial
judge may actually be sympathetic to a verdict based on jury nullification
and wish to open the door fully to that possibility by instructing the jury
on factors other than the elements of the charged crime and allowing the
jury to consider the possible punishment and decide, whether in light of
that punishment, a guilty verdict would be just.201 In the last twenty years,
at least three federal district judges have proposed doing just that, either
in litigation or in scholarly commentary, but federal appellate courts have

199. Baschab, supra note 187, at 114.
200. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Jury Nullification: Setting Reasonable Limits, 11 CHI. B.
ASS’N REC. 16, 16–17 (1997) (noting phenomenon of jury nullification in high profile cases);
Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 987–88 & n.203 (“Realistic observers have noted that defense
attorneys already routinely argue for nullification, though in couched terms.”).
201. See Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1140–41 (2011) (describing the effort of a federal district judge to
inform the jury of the mandatory minimum sentence faced by the child pornography defendant
so that the jury could decide whether to nullify the law—the judge’s effort was thwarted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186,
at 138 (describing a federal trial resulting in an acquittal in which the trial judge “permitted
nullification-related voir dire, a nullification instruction, and nullification argument in a
prosecution for operating an illegal gambling business”) (footnote omitted). See generally Del
Frate, supra note 194, at 180–81; Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s Jury:
Sparf and Hanson v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353 (2004)
(illustrating a federal district judge’s argument, that juries should not be told that they have a
duty to follow the law).
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not been kind to this approach.202 As a result, this is apt to be the rare
case.
The second possibility is that the trial judge will instruct the jury that
it must acquit the defendant if the government has not proven its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it should convict the defendant if the
government has met its burden of proof.203 This instruction opens the door
just a crack to a verdict based on jury nullification. In affirming an
instruction using a “must/should” formulation, the First Circuit noted the
“contrast in directives” and acknowledged that “together with the court’s
refusal to instruct in any detail about the doctrine of jury nullification, [it]
left pregnant the possibility that the jury could ignore the law if it so
chose.”204 In this second scenario, the trial judge may, but is not required
to, take measures to block the assertion of a jury nullification defense.205
The third possibility is that the federal trial judge gives a “must/must”
instruction, for example, that the jury must acquit if it finds the
government has not carried its burden of proof, and it must convict if it
finds the government has proven the charged crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt.206 This instruction attempts to shut the door, to the extent the trial
judge can, to a verdict based on jury nullification. Again, the trial judge
is permitted, but is not forced, to prevent jury nullification arguments.207
B. The Prosecutor Responding to Jury Nullification in Closing
Argument
A federal prosecutor confronts, in closing argument, the potential for
jury nullification in every case. The trial judge, in the rare case, may
actively promote that possibility.208 Far more likely, the trial judge’s
202. Bressler, supra note 201, at 1140–42 (explaining that federal district judges Jack
Weinstein and Gerald Lynch were reversed on appeal after they sought to allow jury
nullification in separate criminal cases). Federal district judge Donald Middlebrooks has
defended jury nullification in a scholarly article. Id. See generally Middlebrooks, supra note
201.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 65 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v.
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1993).
204. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1190.
205. See id.
206. United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 221 (2d Cir. 2005) (agreeing with United States
v. Pierre, 974 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam), that the trial judge may instruct
the jury that it is their duty to convict if they find the government has met its burden of proof).
207. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1190; see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606,
616–18 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that courts have a duty to prevent jury nullification).
208. Legal scholars have been rather sympathetic to allowing jury nullification to have an
explicit part in our criminal legal process. See Bressler, supra note 201, at 1139 (“[S]cholars
almost unanimously agree that when the Constitution and Sixth Amendment were ratified in the
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action will range from subtly acknowledging this possible outcome, by
the use of the pregnant negative in a “must/should” instruction, to an
admonition not to engage in jury nullification and active steps to prevent
it from happening.209
All of the foregoing is meant to show that jury nullification injects an
element of ambiguity into closing arguments. At trial, the ethical
prosecutor wishes to do no more than obtain a conviction based strictly on
the evidence introduced at trial and the jury instructions about to be given
by the trial judge. But the chance of jury nullification means that the battle
during closing arguments may not be fought strictly on those terms,
depending on how the defendant approaches the case.
The defense might encourage acquittal because of how the case was
charged, for example, whether the charges seem disproportionate to the
defendant’s moral culpability,210 or the seemliness of allowing some
leniency to cooperating witnesses who have been charged, or the decision
not to charge a witness at all.211 The defense may try to claim the
punishment for the crime is unfair,212 or seek to emphasize her client’s
contributions to society,213 or seek to portray the fact that the defendant is
a “sympathetic figure” who had previously suffered childhood abuse.214
The realm of argument based on jury nullification is as broad as defense
counsel’s inventiveness.
Arguments for jury nullification can lead to responses from
prosecutors that can give rise to claims of inappropriate arguments. In the
seminal Supreme Court case of United States v. Young, discussed earlier
in this Article, the defense attorney, after having heard a summary of the
evidence by the prosecutor, launched personal attacks at the prosecutor,
intimated that the prosecution deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence,

late eighteenth century, the jury was understood to have the right, not merely the power, to
decide questions of law—and thus to nullify.”). This may portend a movement among judges
and practitioners to accept this practice in the future.
209. See supra Section II.A.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 596 F.3d 1228, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 2010)
(stating that the defendant maintained he was a lesser player in a conspiracy and acknowledged
on appeal that he sought jury nullification because he could not satisfy the elements of a
withdrawal defense).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 676–77 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
defense argued that the lack of prosecution of the government’s witnesses who got a “free ride”
should be basis for acquittal).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, No. 05-12835, 2007 WL 177734, at *842, *846–
47 (11th Cir. Jan. 25, 2007).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 567 Fed. Appx. 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2014).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1997).
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and directly asserted that the prosecutor in the courtroom did not believe
the defendant had intended to defraud anyone, an essential element to the
charged crime.215 The federal prosecutor, as the Young court found,
engaged in improper argument to respond to the defense attorney’s
improper argument.216 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
observed that the situation “was but one example of an all too common
occurrence in criminal trials—the defense counsel argues improperly,
provoking the prosecutor to respond in kind.”217
Without defending the prosecutor’s argument in Young, it is fair to
say he was faced with implicit arguments for jury nullification; that is,
arguments outside the law and evidence. For example, on the claim that
the prosecutor had withheld evidence, the exchange of discovery is not
relevant to the issues at trial and is regulated outside the hearing of the
jury by the judge.218 An invitation to acquit because the prosecutor
subjectively knew that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea was
outside the evidence because the prosecutor could not have testified at the
trial and the jury did not know the prosecutor’s internal thought process.
For both of these arguments, there was nothing properly in the record with
which to respond. On the horns of that dilemma, the prosecutor, according
to the Court, crossed the line with unprofessional comments, some
directed at defense counsel, which were deemed to be inappropriate
statements of personal belief.219
In United States v. Rosa, the defense attorney began closing argument
with vitriolic, if arguably permissible, attacks on the credibility of the
government’s witnesses, but the attorney then went further and
complained about “the United States Government spending your money
and mine trying to get some little fish . . . . Does it not gripe you that the
people who do the dastardly deeds are the ones who get the breaks? The
ones who escape punishment?”220 The propriety and the various reasons
for the government deciding to engage in an investigation and prosecution
are not relevant to the elements of the alleged offenses and therefore were
not before the jury. While “breaks” given to cooperating witnesses are
pertinent to assessing credibility of those witnesses, the defense attorney

215. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
216. See id. at 8–11.
217. Id. at 11.
218. See, e.g., D. Mass. R. 116.1-116.10 (2018) (setting out specific procedures for the
exchange of discovery overseen by magistrate judge).
219. Young, 470 U.S. at 8–9.
220. United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1379 (1st Cir. 1983).
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suggested that the jury’s “gripe” about prosecutorial decisions be a reason
to acquit.221 The defense attorney also accused the government of “using
a whale to catch a minnow” and “cho[osing] to exercise all of its resources
and come down on the head of a lowly police officer simply because he is
a police officer.”222 These were more reasons to decide the case outside
the evidence.
Government counsel responded with a brief statement that the
government stood by its case and that “I, personally, make no excuses for
this case.”223 The Rosa court, without explicitly deciding whether the
remarks were improper personal opinions, held that there was no prejudice
in light of the prior attack by the defense and declined to reverse the
conviction.224 It is worth considering how, in those circumstances, a
prosecutor was hamstrung to respond. The rationale, the internal
deliberations on what charges to bring, and whether to enter into a plea
agreement and on what terms, would not have been part of the evidence.
There may be persuasive reasons, on a moral level, for these prosecutorial
or investigative decisions, but they cannot be shared with the jury.
Likewise, the portrayal of the defendant as a sympathetic character (i.e., a
“lowly police officer” being “crucif[ied]”225) might, depending on the
case, lose some of its luster if the entirety of the defendant’s background,
including inadmissible bad acts, were given to the jury. Jury nullification
efforts like the ones employed in Rosa are one-sided arguments.
Other cases illustrate the conundrum of responding to jury
nullification arguments during the government’s summation. In United
States v. Machor, the defense claimed that the cooperating witness, the
law enforcement agent, and the prosecutor in the courtroom were trying
to frame him for a crime he did not commit.226 How could the prosecutor
respond to a claim that he himself was trying to fabricate a case against
the defendant unless evidence about the workings of the prosecution team
had been introduced at trial? In United States v. Adams, the defendant’s
attorney argued that the government ignored other suspects, but decisions
about arresting and prosecuting people other than the defendant are not
relevant to whether the defendant committed the alleged offenses, so those

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id. at 1379–80.
See id. at 1380.
Id. at 1379.
United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989).
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decisions and the reasons for them were not before the jury.227 In United
States v. Trujillo, the defense attacked the indictment in closing argument,
suggesting nefarious reasons for why certain co-conspirators had not been
named in the charging document, which alleged a drug conspiracy.228 A
prosecutor had drafted the indictment, but that drafting process was surely
not part of the trial.
In each of these cases, the prosecutor responded to the defense
arguments with remarks later challenged on appeal. In Machor, the
prosecutor stated: “‘[I]n order to present this case, do you really think we
have to fabricate it[?] As [the defendant] told you, that even the
prosecutor was here fabricating a case. That’s me.’”229 This was deemed
error, but not reversible error.230 This statement sounded like vouching,
but there was no means to rebut the outside-the-record attack on the
prosecutor. In Adams, the prosecutor responded by saying that the federal
agents could have arrested other people but “‘[t]hey’re not here looking
for numbers.’”231 On appeal, the First Circuit said this “could be viewed
as a form of vouching for the competence and integrity of the police and
probably should not have been said,” but it found that the statement was
not prejudicial.232 In Trujillo, the prosecutor responded by stating that the
judge was responsible for the legal sufficiency of the indictment and that
if the judge thought the indictment was not proper, the jury would not have
been asked to decide the case.233 This rejoinder, an accurate statement
about the roles of the judge and jury, was deemed not to be error,234 but as
a matter of advocacy, it probably failed to thwart the real thrust of the
defendant’s attack. Questioning who was named in the indictment was
probably designed to emphasize the unfairness of charging one defendant
when others were not charged. Addressing that would have required
argument outside the evidence.
“In our tradition, defense counsel are allowed a good measure of
latitude in summing up to the jury . . . .”235 While courts have
acknowledged the thrust and parry nature of improper closing arguments
by defense counsel and prosecutors, there has been little recognition of the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

United States v. Adams, 305 F.3d 30, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2002).
United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 104 (11th Cir. 1983).
Machor, 879 F.2d at 955 (first alteration in original).
Id. at 955–56.
Adams, 305 F.3d at 37.
Id.
Trujillo, 714 F.2d at 104.
Id. at 104–05.
Adams, 305 F.3d at 38.
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conundrum that jury nullification arguments create for prosecutors. It is
not just a matter of “fighting fire with fire,”236 as if counsel are simply
trading heated personal insults. Rather, there is often, as these examples
demonstrate, a deeper purpose behind improper defense argument. It is
not just a matter of turning up the heat in the courtroom, but rather an
attempt to take the jury outside the facts and the law, and to decide the
case based on sympathy for the defendant or disgust for the government.
Once the debate ventures outside the evidence introduced during the trial,
the ethical prosecutor has few tools in her forensic toolkit.
III. CLOSING ARGUMENT SHOULD MIRROR THE TRIAL
A. Toward a Better Rule on Vouching and Personal Opinion
As one scholar has said about the law of closing argument in North
Dakota, the cases “do not provide easy reading.”237 Another commentator
has said that “the state and federal courts are perpetually divided as to
what constitutes proper closing argument, which is at best ‘wrought with
uncertainty.’”238 The most recent treatment of the subject from the United
States Supreme Court, United States v. Young, acknowledged the
difficulty in drawing a line between acceptable and unacceptable
statements, noting “there is often a gray zone.”239 The discussion of
federal cases in Part I of this Article, as well as decisions from Maine and
Kansas, illustrate the ongoing difficulty courts and practitioners have had
in applying the rule against vouching and personal opinion in closing
arguments.
This Article has attempted to explain why this area of the law has
been so difficult for courts to articulate. Put simply, the effort in federal
courts to allow arguments on key issues, including witness credibility,
while separating out statements of personal opinion, has run aground
because repeated attempts to identify forbidden words and phrases has
rendered a body of case law that is contradictory and elevates form over
substance. The experiences of Maine and Kansas, jurisdictions which
have tried to set stricter standards by disallowing argument on witness
credibility altogether, are not more encouraging.240 If taken seriously,
236. Id. at 37.
237. Ahlen, supra note 15, at 102.
238. Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An
Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 69 (2001) (quoting Gary D.
Fox, Objectionable Closing Argument: Causes and Solutions, 70 FLA. B.J. 43, 47 (1996)).
239. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
240. See supra Sections I.C.5.a–b.
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these standards eliminate meaningful argument on the key issues in the
trial. If honored in the breach, the strict standards sow more confusion
than ever.
The fundamental issue is that courts have failed to give independent
meaning to the rule against statements of personal belief. If, for example,
a prosecutor’s first-person statement refers to matters that were not subject
to proof during the trial, it is covered by the rule against arguing outside
the evidence, which I have called the prime directive.241 If the prosecutor
seeks to assure the jury about the credibility of the police witnesses
because she knows them well from working with them in many cases, that
is impermissible vouching and violative of the prime directive as well.
The rule against personal opinions, if it means anything, must apply where
those two concerns are not present. Where courts have explained the rule
against personal opinions in terms of arguing outside the evidence or
vouching, they have left pregnant the question of what the rule against
personal opinions means.
Literally speaking, almost everything a prosecutor says during
closing argument is a statement of personal belief. Unless a statement of
the prosecutor is a statement of fact, it is a statement of opinion, in that it
draws an inference or a conclusion. Advocacy is the expression of
opinions. Effective advocacy is the expression of opinions, wellsupported by facts and logic. All those opinions, for the prosecutor, are
personal. The prosecutor has decided to pursue the case, and he must,
under attorneys’ ethics rules, honestly and subjectively believe that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, the defense
attorney may subjectively believe his client is, without a doubt, guilty, but
he honors his profession by zealously arguing for acquittal based on the
evidence at trial. It is glaringly obvious to any juror that the prosecutor
subjectively believes in what he is arguing. It insults the intelligence of
jurors to think that they would perceive an “it is submitted” statement to
be any less of a personal belief than an “I submit” statement. In either
case, the government lawyer is doing the submitting, and even converting
a statement to the passive voice still leaves the prosecutor in the courtroom
as the speaker.
For these reasons, courts are able, with some reason, to identify
almost any portion of disputed closing argument by the prosecutor and say
it violated the rule against personal opinions. After all, it is hard to say
that suggesting that a witness was not telling the truth, or that a defendant
committed fraud is not an opinion, inference, or conclusion. And since

241. See supra Section I.B.
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the prosecutor is the person making the statement, it is personal. Then
again, arguing that a drug defendant intended to distribute two kilograms
of cocaine found in his car because he had just texted his customer the
price for the drugs and had arranged a time to meet the person is also an
inference or conclusion, and it is equally personal. But a classic argument
like that is never thought to fall within the rule against personal opinions.
So, what is the difference between acceptable and unacceptable
personal opinions? If the only difference is that one argument is supported
by the evidence (like the example about the cocaine found in the car) and
another argument is not, then the prosecutorial sin is violating the prime
directive, and the rule against personal opinions has no independent
meaning.
Experience has shown that the rule against personal opinion—when
it does have independent meaning—functions as a civility code enforced
by appellate judges after the fact.242 Because the literal scope of the rule
is so vast, it is a convenient mechanism for picking out statements or
words that judges would prefer not to hear and calling them out as
violating the rule against personal opinion. The countless decisions
condemning the words “lie,” “lying,” or “liar” can best be understood as
simply a feeling that it is impolite to directly accuse—in person, no less—
somebody of lying. These decisions make little or no distinction, as they
ought to, between accusing the defendant of “lying” in his courtroom
testimony and being a “liar.” The latter characterization could, depending
on the context in which the word is used, suggest the defendant has a track
record of lying that has not been shared with the jury. The distinctions in
phraseology that many courts have found so important, where they
acknowledge that the jury could properly receive the same substantive
argument from the prosecutor, is simply a preference for a more genteel
or more elevated delivery. Substituting “I am telling you that” with “the
government submits that” takes the edge off the words that follow. Such
substitutions reflect a preference for a formal way of talking over plain
speaking. After all, who, in ordinary conversation, would say in reference
to an important matter “a conclusion on your part may be drawn,” rather
than “I think”?
Of course, some courts permit more plain speaking than others. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had held that a
prosecutor’s use of “colorful pejoratives” like “fraudster” and “Jason
Branch is a fraud” was not improper where “the closing was limited to

242. See supra Section I.C.
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what the government (and ultimately the jury) believed the evidence had
proved.”243 Some federal and state courts have found that the use of the
word “lie” is acceptable as a means of arguing the evidence, whereas as
others find it to be beyond the pale (i.e., per se misconduct).244 In Maine,
it was deemed acceptable to say that the defendant was an admitted liar,
where he admitted to lying on the stand, but it was improper to say, based
on the evidence, that a defendant charged with lying had lied since the
defendant himself did not admit that he had lied.245 In that situation, the
prosecutor must take care not to contradict the defendant in an adversarial
proceeding. In sketching out the rule against personal opinion, the rules
seem to be a matter of taste.
It is worth remembering that violations of the rule against personal
opinions are analyzed in federal court under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.246 Thus, where prosecutorial statements are
found to be improper, it is a Constitutional violation. Where the error
results in overturning a conviction, the remark must have “so infected the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.”247 Where closing argument error is found due to characteristics
of phrasing; where general, concluding remarks about the defendant’s
guilt are error; where error is found when the prosecutor argues that the
defendant lied when the evidence supports that inference;248 it is difficult
to believe that these kinds of error are of a fundamental, constitutional
magnitude. The lack of harm, if any, from many of the statements that
have been found to violate the rule against personal opinions is readily
apparent to any reader. A finishing sentence like, “I think when you look
at the evidence in this case and use your common sense, there’s only one
conclusion you can reach and that is that this defendant Joseph Smith has

243. United States v. Branch, 591 F.3d 602, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2009).
244. See Claire Gagnon, Note, A Liar by Any Other Name? Iowa’s Closing Argument
Conundrum, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 490 (2007) (explaining that although Iowa does not allow
the prosecutor to argue that the defendant lied, most jurisdictions do); Craig Lee Montz, Calling
the Witness a Liar During Closing Argument: The Florida Supreme Court’s Final Approval, 75
FLA. B.J. 49, 50 (2001) (explaining that it is permissible in Florida to call a witness a liar if the
evidence supports the conclusion); see also supra Sections I.C.4–5.
245. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123 (Me. 1993).
246. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1974).
247. See id.; see also Branch, 591 F.3d at 609 (“[W]hen a prosecutor’s remarks are
arguably improper, the defendant must still prove that these remarks made the entire trial
fundamentally unfair and the verdict would have changed absent these comments.” (citing
Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447 (8th Cir.1999))); United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 255 (2d
Cir. 2002) (same).
248. See supra Sections I.C.3–5.
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been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,”249 does not scream out
that the fairness of the trial has, in one blow, been undermined. Rather, it
is the prosecutor asking the jury to find the defendant guilty, something
that everyone in the courtroom would expect a prosecutor to do. When a
court then says that the prosecutorial sin can be expiated by changing “I
think” to “the government submits,” the legal analysis has left the
constitutional realm.
While some courts have frequently found prosecutorial misconduct
in closing argument, it is far less likely for courts to find that the error was
so prejudicial that overturning the conviction is necessary.250 Only when
the errant remark has “‘so poisoned the well’ that it is likely that the
verdict was affected,” will a conviction be vacated.251 The touchstones
for prejudice from statements of personal opinion are references to matters
outside the evidence and vouching.252 This shows that the harm from
these kinds of statements stems not from their “personal” nature, but from
lack of adherence to the prime directive. If the prosecutor is arguing
within the evidence, most courts will find that straying into forbidden
formulations does not impact the trial.253 It is worth asking, then, whether
many of these violations ought to be considered constitutional error at all
if there is no discernible harmful impact on the trial.254
The legal system would be better off if the current rule against
personal opinions were simply abolished. The foregoing analysis has
shown that the search to find independent meaning in this rule has been
fruitless.255 It functions as a convenient mechanism to enforce the varying
norms of decorum which exist around the country, with the range of

249. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted).
250. Cicchini, supra note 61, at 893–95 (noting with frustration how infrequently closing
argument errors lead to reversal).
251. Smith, 982 F.2d at 682 (quoting United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274
(1st Cir. 1987)).
252. See United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 771–72 (1st Cir. 1996).
253. See supra Section I.C.3 (discussing various First Circuit cases in which error was
found for expression of personal opinion but no reversible error was found).
254. United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 916 (6th Cir. 2007). One case from the Sixth
Circuit drew perhaps the finest of distinctions to find a statement improper, but not prejudicial
error: “The difference between what the prosecutor actually said—‘he is a liar’—and what the
prosecutor could have permissibly said, that the evidence suggested that Defendant Hinton’s
testimony is not credible, is minimal. This statement does not require reversal . . . .” Id. This
phenomenon of finding error where there is no substantive difference between an acceptable
and unacceptable statement, but then finding no prejudice, degrades the idea of a violation of
constitutional rights.
255. See supra Section I.C.

2 - GRANT. PUBLISHER READY 2.19.2019(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

MIRRORING THE TRIAL

2/28/2019 10:36 PM

47

acceptable commentary established by the eye of the beholder.256 Courts
and practitioners could stop puzzling over whether remarks are “personal”
or not and focus on the true harm that can come from improper
summations. The constitutional analysis should concentrate on whether
the prosecutor has tried to use facts outside the record to secure a
conviction or has attempted to lend the prestige of his office or the office
of the police department to the weight of her case. This is the true concern
of the rule against personal opinions.
This proposal would place this area of the law on closing arguments
on a stronger analytical foundation. With the prime directive at the center
of the inquiry, courts and practitioners could analyze whether the
prosecutor’s closing has stayed within the bounds of the trial. “In arguing
the law to the jury, counsel is confined to principles that will later be
incorporated and charged to the jury.”257 Likewise with the facts,
attorneys should be confined to the evidence introduced by the parties and
deemed admissible during the course of the trial by the trial judge.
Closing arguments should mirror the trial.
A practitioner deciding ex ante whether to make a particular argument
should simply ask whether the matter was part of the trial. If, for example,
certain bad acts of the defendant were known to the prosecutor but were
excluded by the trial judge as unfairly prejudicial, then those bad acts
should not be part of closing argument, even if responsive to the defense
attorney’s arguments. Closing argument is not the time to bring in new
facts or new theories. Improper vouching can be discerned by this
mirroring principle. If the police officer has been allowed to testify about
the number of years of his experience, then that may be part of the
argument. If the police officer has not testified about the collateral
consequences to his career if he lies on the stand, as he probably would
not be allowed to do, then that point is out of bounds and cannot be used
to bolster the credibility of the police witness.258
At the same time, arguments that comply with this mirroring principle
should be permitted. Thus, when a defendant has testified and has offered
an implausible, inconsistent, self-serving version of events, it is fair to

256. Because these norms are established through appellate review, often due to alleged
errors neither objected to, nor censured by the trial judge, closing arguments are judged by how
the words appear on paper. See supra Sections I.C.5.a–b (showing the unworkability of strict
rules against personal opinion in Maine and Kansas).
257. United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v.
Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712, 714 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
258. See Pettys, supra note 190, at 517 (explaining that under traditional rules of evidence
and procedure “a plain symmetry exists between evidentiary relevance, on the one hand, and
jury instructions and closing arguments, on the other”).
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argue that the defendant lied, fabricated, or told a tall tale, where that
conclusion is supported by references to the evidence. Similarly, arguing
that other witnesses have told the truth should be allowed as long as it is
in the context of arguing the evidence in the case. A general concluding
or introductory statement, such as the “defendant lied to his customers and
committed fraud,” should be acceptable where it is a way to headline a
discussion about the evidence supporting a defendant’s guilt on fraud
charges.
Focusing counsel’s attention on the basic principle of confining
oneself to the evidence and the law introduced during the trial is a sounder
approach than a list of “guidelines,” which some well-meaning
commentators have suggested.259 These varying guidelines tend to be
nearly as general and as indeterminate as the maxim of prohibiting
statements of personal opinion. Telling an attorney that she may “[u]rge
the jury to draw reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence”
while also repeating the admonition to steer clear of statements of personal
belief260 returns the attorney to the same contradictions and
inconsistencies which have made the case law not “easy reading.”261
The mirroring concept, which is simply a corollary to the prime
directive, would be used to police constitutional violations stemming from
improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument. That is not to
say that courts would be compelled to accept any standard of behavior, so
long as the lawyer confined himself to arguing the evidence and stayed
within the law articulated by the trial judge. Trial judges have broad
discretion in the conduct of trials.262 There are remarks, as one
experienced Massachusetts trial judge has written, that fall within the
category of “better left unsaid”263:
Juries are entitled to better than “don’t let the smoke fool you,” “throw
the defendant’s testimony out the window, because it’s all baloney;”
“this case is about a desperate man, a predator getting his prey into
that motel room and leaving her there for dead;” and “take everything
the defendant said and throw it in the garbage can.”264

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
2002)).

See Ahlen, supra note 15, at 105–07; Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1327–34.
Ahlen, supra note 15, at 106–07.
See id. at 102.
See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985).
Agnes, supra note 25, at 35.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Ormonde, 770 N.E.2d 36, 39–40 (Mass. App. Ct.
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Language like that could well be called “crude,” “bombastic,” or
“sarcastic,”265 and subject to censure, or the language could be deemed, in
the taste of the presiding trial judge, and in the context of a particular trial,
acceptable plain speaking. In either event, this mode of expression is not
the stuff of a violation of fundamental constitutional rights.266
It should be possible to regulate attorney behavior during closing
argument, and even to impose varying, particular, modes of decorum,
without making it a matter of constitutional import. This is a proposal, in
other words, to delegate the policing of language and tone during closing
arguments to the trial court level, and to leave it there. Appellate courts
analyzing whether due process has in fact been denied should be looking
to the mirroring principle and to violations of the prime directive to decide
whether the prosecutor has played by the rules of the trial or has done real
harm by violating them. Thus, the system could address the legitimate
concern articulated by Justice Burger in Young, where he observed that
the unseemly back-and-forth between defense counsel and the prosecutor
“has no place in the administration of justice.”267 The better remedy to
this breakdown in professionalism “would have been for the District Judge
to deal with the improper argument of the defense counsel promptly and
thus blunt the need for the prosecutor to respond.”268 The real issue in
Young was not that a fundamentally fair trial was in jeopardy because the
prosecutor couched his remarks as “personal impressions” when invited
to do so by defense counsel, but that counsel’s verbal jousting gave the
trial an unbecoming look.269 This is the sort of sub-constitutional concern
that trial judges are well-equipped to deal with in the moment.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between oral advocacy that is
sub-optimal, or not effective, and closing arguments that create legal error.
As a prosecutor who tries cases, I find many of the challenged closing
arguments found in the case reporters cringe-worthy, at least on the cold
paper. Repeatedly calling the defendant a liar is not my style and I would
not do it even if it were permitted. It just does not seem effective, whereas
maintaining one’s dignity and being precise and logical with the facts and
the law tends to imbue the prosecutor in the courtroom with more
credibility. On the other hand, not all lawyers operate at the same level of
265. Id.
266. Ormonde, 770 N.E.2d at 39–40 (finding no error in closing argument that was on the
“crude side”).
267. Young, 470 U.S. at 9.
268. Id. at 13.
269. Id. at 10 (emphasizing the trial judge’s responsibility to maintain proper decorum in
the courtroom).
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competence, or at least with the same style. As long as trials continue to
have closing arguments,270 the zone of acceptable advocacy must be fairly
wide. Lawyers have different vocabularies, different ways of expressing
themselves, and different capacities to modulate between ordinary, plain
speaking, and more lawyerly speech. Moreover, a closing argument is not
a written or memorized speech. At their best, closing arguments are a mix
of careful preparation and extemporaneous speaking. 271 As such,
forbidding common verbal formulations, like all first-person statements,
is a trap that will be sprung with regularity because even the most cautious
advocate can, in a split second, preface a comment on the evidence with
“I think” because it is so natural to do so. Refocusing the prosecutor’s
charge on staying within the evidence introduced at trial is a way to avoid
these needless traps and stumbles.
B. Policing Jury Nullification Efforts More Effectively
The mirroring principle proposed in this Article is an effective means
to understand and implement the rules relating to arguing within the
evidence, vouching, and personal opinions. It is also a useful concept in
understanding and policing appeals to jury nullification during closing
arguments. As discussed in Part II of this Article, jury nullification
occupies an ambiguous place in criminal trials, and this ambiguity
presents a conundrum for the prosecutor when faced with an argument
based in whole or in part on jury nullification.
While appellate courts have generally adopted a hostile attitude to
jury nullification in our legal system, they have not required that a trial
judge give an instruction that the jury must convict if it finds the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, much as the jury is told that it must
acquit if it finds that the government had not met its burden of proof.272 It
is not clear what the case is for making this a matter of the trial judge’s
discretion, for example, allowing the trial judge to simply say that the jury
“should” convict if it finds the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
270. Cf. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) (“There can be no doubt that
closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a
criminal trial.”).
271. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646–47 (1974) (“[C]losing arguments
of counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear.”) (emphasis omitted).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1993);
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 3.02
(U.S. DIST. COURT ME. 2018), https://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf/crpjilinks.pdf (providing that
the jury must acquit if the evidence is insufficient; the jury should convict if the government has
met its burden).
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doubt. This, as the First Circuit has recognized, subtly suggests the
possibility of jury nullification,273 even though juries (except in a handful
of states) are not to be instructed explicitly on jury nullification.274 While
there are many matters that are necessarily left to the trial judge’s
discretion, there is no good reason to encourage a non-uniform response
to jury nullification, unless, of course, one seeks to promote jury
nullification, which some scholars, practitioners, and judges have done.275
Allowing or not allowing jury nullification is a basic proposition that
requires a single, unequivocal answer. Appellate courts should require
that trial judges give a “must/must” instruction. That is, the jury must
acquit if there is reasonable doubt, and it must convict if the government
has met its burden of proof. Failing that, they should do a better job of
explaining why perpetuating the ambiguity of jury nullification serves a
laudable purpose. For the same reasons, appellate courts should require,
rather than simply permit, trial judges to block efforts by defense counsel
from raising jury nullification arguments.
So long as trial judges retain the discretion to give a “must/must”
instruction, they should do so. Similarly, the trial judge should prevent
defense counsel from making jury nullification arguments either before or
during closing argument. With both of these steps, the trial judge can
prevent a mismatch between the scope of the trial and the scope of closing
argument. Evidence would be admitted according to lawful notions of
relevance, and the prosecutor and defense attorney would argue within the
facts introduced at trial. The prosecutor would not be tempted to respond
to outside-the-record arguments by defense counsel by going outside the
record herself. To those who believe in a criminal justice system without
jury nullification—apart from the jury’s naked power to engage in it—
having both sides arguing within the evidence is the best-case scenario.
The mirroring principle provides an effective response to those who
would prefer to open the door a crack to jury nullification (i.e., with a
“must/should” instruction and the trial judge taking no steps to block jury
nullification arguments) or to those who want to open the door entirely to
jury nullification. The mirroring principle says that permitting jury
nullification arguments means that the scope of evidence admitted at trial

273. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1189–90.
274. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 133 (“[T]he prevailing judicial opinion
steadfastly has been opposed to permitting the jury to know that it has the power to acquit ‘in
the teeth of both the law and facts.’”).
275. See Bressler, supra note 201, at 1140–41; Del Frate, supra note 194, at 180–88;
Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 138.
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should be revisited.276 If, for example, defense counsel seeks an acquittal
based on an appeal to sympathy for the defendant, and the trial judge will
allow that argument to be made, then the prosecution should be permitted
to present information about some of the defendant’s unsympathetic
characteristics. If the defense is to be allowed to argue that the
government’s charging decisions unfairly targeted a “little fish,” then the
government should be permitted to put on evidence and explain why it
made the charging decisions it did. This would include showing the
societal benefit in deterring such “little fish” from engaging in criminal
behavior, or showing that the defendant is not such a “little fish,” based
on, for example, his criminal record. If the defense wishes to argue that a
mandatory minimum sentence would be unjust and that a jury should
consider the potential punishment before deciding whether to convict,
then the government should be allowed to present the sort of information
that a judge considers at a sentencing hearing, such as, again, the
defendant’s criminal history.
If these scenarios seem unpalatable for proponents of jury
nullification, it is only because litigating the righteousness of the
government’s cause is apt to be a fraught endeavor for the defendant when
the jury hears both sides.277 Ordinarily, efforts at jury nullification take
place where the defense can create a mismatch between the scope of the
trial and the scope of closing argument. It is in this space that the defense
attorney advances a jury nullification argument, and the prosecutor has
nothing in the record to rebut the argument with. In that case, the
government’s choices are to leave, for example, a charge that the
prosecutor in the courtroom is trying to fabricate a case against the
defendant,278 unaddressed, which could be taken by the jury as a tacit
admission, or the government could respond in kind by going outside the
record, which would be error. This latter scenario would seem to be the
worst-case scenario, with the jury hearing argument from both sides
unconnected to the evidence they heard during the trial. How is a jury to
evaluate an argument when it has not heard the evidence establishing the

276. See Pettys, supra note 190, at 517 (explaining that symmetry must exist between
evidence and closing arguments under traditional rules of evidence).
277. See id. at 518–22 (noting the substantial implications that allowing moral appeals
from both sides would have on closing arguments); Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 987–99
(permitting jury nullification and defense counsel to argue for it would “radically alter the scope
of the modern criminal trial,” including substantial changes to the rules of evidence).
278. See United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989).
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facts underlying that argument? As the Young court said, “two improper
arguments—two apparent wrongs—do not make for a right result.”279
Applying the mirroring principle to a bid for jury nullification is a
mental exercise that should discourage courts from allowing jury
nullification arguments to enter the trial at all and should encourage courts
to take active steps to prevent it. When Judge Weinstein suggested that a
jury ought to be informed of the mandatory minimum sentence in a child
pornography case,280 did he envision putting before the jury all of the
matters a judge would consider at sentencing, such as victim impact
statements from the children whose pictures were in the defendant’s
collection, the defendant’s prior criminal record, the defendant’s
upbringing and home life, and his drug history? If not, the jury would be
invited to consider punishment in the context of the government’s
evidence being confined to the narrow question of whether the defendant
committed the alleged child pornography crimes, leaving a very
incomplete picture of the matters relevant to punishment.281 If evidence
would be taken on all of these issues relating to punishment, the trial
would grow to enormous proportions—it would be a tale of the
defendant’s whole life, plus a whole host of other matters. There would
be rival versions of the defendant’s childhood, and no doubt, of the
circumstances of his prior criminal cases. The trial would be
unmanageable, with the questions of morality and sympathy for the
defendant overshadowing the question of whether sufficient proof exists
for the alleged offense or offenses. It would be the very picture of
lawlessness.
Addressing the ambiguous place of jury nullification in closing
arguments requires the attention of the trial judge to this issue during the
entirety of the trial, and it requires the prosecutor to object when he or she
sees it. More importantly, it requires the judiciary as a whole to decide
279. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
280. See United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated
on other grounds, 393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir. 2010).
281. See id. at 199 for the district judge’s reference to the “jury’s historic Sixth
Amendment mercy-dispensing powers.” The judge thought said powers could be unleashed in
view of “the special circumstances [of] the mandatory minimum sentence unknown to the jury,
the need for psychiatric help in view of sexual childhood abuse, the locked door behind which
viewing took place, and other factors.” Id. at 204. The district judge paints a sympathetic
picture of the defendant’s upbringing in Italy and other personal history, matters which are not
susceptible of easy proof unless a fact-finder is inclined to simply take the defendant at his word
on these historical facts. See id. at 138–41. His view of matters outside the normal bounds of
relevance is rather myopic, as if the only thing a jury seeking to weigh the moral righteousness
of the case, beyond the evidence of the crime alleged, is the defendant’s background. It is as if
the children in the thousands of child pornography images, whom the district judge refers to
simply as “young girls,” are not in the equation. See id. at 138.
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the basic proposition of whether it is for or against jury nullification. So
long as that question remains unanswered, defendants will be tempted to
make arguments outside the evidence and the law, and prosecutors will
struggle to respond.
CONCLUSION
There is crying need for the parts of the law of closing argument
discussed in this Article to be re-interpreted and simplified. The law
should be grounded in functional concerns rather than particular modes of
expression. The closing arguments at the end of trials should reflect or
mirror the evidence admitted during the trial. Reviewing alleged
prosecutorial summation errors by that simple principle would parse out
proper and improper argument. Hewing to this mirroring principle would
also help stamp out jury nullification from our criminal trials, which
would advance the interests of the rule of law.

